Introduction
Most of the literature on the role of the Court of Justice ("the Court" or the "CJEU") in European Union ("EU") competition law reflects on the past. 1 With few exceptions, those studies praise the CJEU for its pivotal contribution to establishing the conceptual foundations of EU competition law. 2 Less, however, has been written on the current role of the Court, and surely even less on its future.
To offer a modest, yet hopefully original gift to the Court for its 60 th anniversary, this short article looks into the crystal ball. It first seeks to predict the shape of things to come, and argues that despite an inexorable quantitative trend of reduced Court intervention in competition cases, its qualitative influence as the ultimate rule-maker in EU competition law should further burst into prominence (I).
Second, it opines that with the Court's increasingly important rule-making role, comes the heightened responsibility of setting the "right" competition law standard. However, given the subjective vagaries of assessing what a "right" competition law standard is, this article advances that the Court's responsibility should be construed objectively, in terms of setting "consistent" competition law standards (II).
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I. The Court's Future Role -Rule-Making in EU Competition Law
The science of making predictions is complex. Oracles, mediums, scientists, investors and competition authorities alike often search into the recent past to forecast the future. Drawing judgments. But as the United States ("US") experience suggests, this system reduces the number of competition cases in the first place (the agency rarely goes to Court), and thus the subsequent workload of the appeals courts system. Second, the Court's marginalization in EU competition law may also be nurtured by "bottomup" jurisdictional transfers. In this context, with the contemplated accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR") and its own court's system, the Court may lose some grip on fundamental rights issues. 10 Finally, the unbridled development of negotiated procedures in EU competition law extinguishes opportunities for litigation before the General Court and, a fortiori, before the upper EU Court in last instance.
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The "success" of leniency applications and (to a lesser extent though) of settlements in cartel cases, as well the rise of Article 9 commitments as the "normal procedure" in non-cartel cases leave little scope for appeal. Addressees of decisions adopted under these procedures are in practice less likely to challenge them before the GC, and even less so before the Court. And in light of the wide margin of discretion recognized to the Commission by the Court in Alrosa, appeals by third parties (in particular complainants) are somewhat illusory. 12 All in all, this augurs a gloomy future for the Court. But this scenario has a major flaw. It is based on far-fetched and wholly unrealistic assumptions. First, it is doubtful that competition law constitutes a priority area for the creation of a specialised court, all the more so given the decreasing backlog of competition cases due to negotiated arrangements. As a matter of fact, most discussions on the creation of a specialized court concern the field of intellectual property ("IP").
Moreover, the Court itself has already trumped a possible feudal subordination to the Strasbourg Court. In its judgments in KME Germany v. Commission and Chalkor v. by Article 6(1) of the ECHR", and that "it is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47".
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B.
A Rule-Making Court?
The second scenario makes a more rosy, and credible prediction. It starts from the premise that with the transfer towards the GC of granular decision-reviewing duties, 14 the CJEU has progressively morphed into a rule-making court, dealing with principled institutional, procedural and substantive competition law issues through the preliminary reference channel under Article 263 TFEU and upon appeals on points of law pursuant to Article 256 TFEU. etc., which all define, or refine, legal standards constitute striking illustrations of this.
Looking ahead, this second scenario prophesizes that the CJEU's orbital position as the ultimate rule-maker in the competition galaxy will gain even more brightness. To be sure, the point here is not so much that the number of cases brought to the CJEU in relation to principled issues will increase.
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Rather, the nub of the argument is qualitative in nature. The substance of the competition law issues that remain to be settled by the CJEU has perhaps never been that fundamental.
26
EU competition law lies indeed at several junctures. First, a debate over the goals of EU competition law (e.g., consumer welfare, efficiency, industrial 13 See CJEU, Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission, not yet reported, § §51 and 52. 14 Covering both first instance annulment proceedings under article 263 TFEU and unlimited jurisdiction proceedings against fines and penalties under article 261 TFEU. 15 Setting the standard on refusal to deal in the presence of IP rights. 16 Setting the standard for the appraisal of the effect on trade condition, when third countries are concerned. 17 Setting the standard on collective dominance and the failing firm defense in merger cases. 18 Setting the standard of judicial review to be applied by the General Court. 19 Refining the standard for the appraisal of existing collective dominant positions. 20 Recalling the standard for the appraisal on restrictions on parallel trade under Article 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU. 21 Setting a standard for the appraisal on restrictions on parallel trade under Article 102 TFEU. 22 Refining the notion of a concerted practice. 23 Setting the standard for the appraisal of margin squeezes under Article 102 TFEU. 24 Recalling, and refining the standard for the appraisal of rebates, and other exclusivity inducing schemes under Article 102 TFEU. 25 We believe it may, considering the wide range of principled issues that remain unsettled. But as a matter of fact, the quantitative statistics on the number of competition cases dealt with by the CJEU reveal no such tendency, quite to the contrary. policy, redistribution, etc.) has unraveled, and is currently raging. The amount of scholarship devoted to this issue in recent years bears testimony to the view that the goals of EU competition law remain unclear. 27 Second, the substantive and evidentiary standards applied in competition law are in a state of limbo. The injection, under the impetus of the EU Commission, of a "more economic" approach since 1999 has not followed a homogeneous development across the various areas of competition enforcement (i.e., under Article 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU and the EU Merger Regulation). 28 In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the venom of divide has contaminated the Commission. On the one hand, the Directorate General for Competition of the Commission ("DG COMP") has planted in a variety of instruments a whole host of economics-driven standards for the assessment of anticompetitive conduct (in decisions, Guidelines, Communications, etc.). 29 In essence, those standards go beyond the black-letter law of the Treaty, and manifest DG COMP's willingness to voluntarily discharge a higher burden of proof in competition cases. On the other hand, the Legal Service, which represents the Commission before the EU Courts, keeps on promoting "textualistic" -and arguably lower -evidentiary standards, that shield the Commission from risks of judicial annulment.
And, as cases come and go, the GC sometimes upholds or invalidates either type of standard.
For instance, in the Glaxo dual pricing case, the GC endorsed the more economic approach for the assessment of agreements that restrict parallel trade. 30 Yet it seemed to disregard it in other judgments such as Tomra, Telefonica, British Airways, etc. And in some cases, the GC parted ways both with the Commission and with prior case-law. For instance, in Microsoft v.
Commission the GC somewhat diluted the Magill and IMS Health tests established by the CJEU with a view to assessing refusals to supply under Article 102 TFEU.
With this background, in many areas several standards which remain untested before the CJEU compete for the assessment of anticompetitive practices. Pending a last resort pronouncement of the CJEU, it is unclear which one of those standards shall apply. This issue is particularly important in the field of abuse of dominance and merger control. 
VEBIC,
33
Tele2 Polska, 34 and Pfleiderer cases).
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In most, if not all those cases, the issue boils down to a complex trade-off between the general principles of procedural autonomy and effectiveness of EU law which the Court, and it only, enjoys a monopoly to settle. Fourth, with rising fines akin to quasi-criminal sanctions, the EU administrative procedure for competition cases is in the line for fire.
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Lawyers increasingly challenge the compatibility of the EU procedural system with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 37 Many components of the EU procedural system have been deferred to the CJEU -e.g., 31 A precision is here in order as regards the EUMR. For all these reasons, the 60 years old CJEU still faces the challenge of settling a wide array of novel, interesting competition law issues. And this is likely to reinforce its position as the predominant rule-maker in EU competition law.
All in all, we view this second scenario as more credible than the first one, if only because it is a scenario "à droit constant", which is not contingent on the creation of new EU judicial organs.
II.
The Court's Future Responsibility -Setting "Consistent" EU Competition Law
Standards
A. Conceptual and Definitional Remarks
The rise of the Court as the ultimate rule-maker in EU competition law comes with a challenge. Put simply, the Court must set the "right" competition law standards.
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Unfortunately, however, there is no commanding benchmark to help the Court separate wheat from chaff. Rather there is a wealth of -possibly conflicting -perspectives, on what makes "good" and "bad" law.
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As a crude proxy, economists praise legal standards that promote economic welfare.
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In contrast, lawyers favor standards that ensure legal certainty.
44
But economists and lawyers often disagree amongst themselves. Competition economists are for instance split on whether competition law should promote "total" or "consumer" welfare. 45 Similarly, competition lawyers are divided on whether general "forms-based" rules or case-by-case "effects-based" assessments promote legal certainty.
Finally, the opinions of each and everyone often hinge on social, professional, ideological, psychological and other personal biases. More specifically, one cannot exclude that lawyers and economic consultants stand for legal standards that are not adverse to their clients'
interests.
Given the wealth of available alternative benchmarks, on which grounds should the Court select the "right" competition law standard? The author of these lines is certainly underqualified to address this intractable question. Yet, it is submitted that, for the Court to meet the challenge of setting the "right" competition law standards -and shut out the somewhat undeserved, yet frequent criticisms of certain practitioners -it should seek, as a bottom-line, to ensure "consistency" in rule-making. Consistency can be generally defined as devising coherent standards for related factual, economic and legal settings.
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Our belief that consistency must be the minimum common denominator of any "right" competition law standard is grounded on the view that it is a dispassionate notion. Unlike many other proposed benchmarks (e.g., efficiency, welfare, fairness, economic freedom), it leaves little space for ideology, conflicts of interests, and other biases.
47
In addition, from a decision-making perspective, the principle of consistency is respectful of the Court's discretionary power. In many cases, several consistent legal standards will compete for the regulation of a given factual, economic or legal situation. In such settings, it will remain up to the CJEU with the assistance of the parties, to set what it deems the most adequate standard.
48
In a spirit of assistance, the following sections offer some fresh thoughts on three possible facets of "consistency" which may arguably help the Court face the challenge of setting adequate competition law standards.
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The analysis is creative in nature, given the dearth of 45 See R. VAN 47 But other benchmarks may also fulfill this condition. One could think, for instance, of devising "ergonomic", or "business-friendly" competition law standard (its practicability), i.e. standards that are easy to comply with. A benchmark of this kind could be tested by assessing how much compliance costs it inflicts on companies. 48 Put differently, the concept of consistency leaves scope for debate. It does not necessarily dictate a given legal standard, but plays as a useful filter which narrows down the range of options available to the judge. 49 This in no way suggests that the Court does not test, in current judicial practice, the "consistency" of its competition law standards. As will be seen below, it certainly does so, but not explicitly, through its own guidance in general EU law on consistency in rule-making.
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It uses the competition case-law of the Court to offer illustrations of consistencies and inconsistencies in rule-making.
B. "Transversal Consistency", or Consistency across Competition Rules
A first best rule-making practice is to ensure consistency across the various domains of EU competition law. This can be referred to as "tranversal consistency". Despite their distinct scope of application,
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Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU and the EUMR aim at one and the same thing, i.e., "ensuring that competition is not distorted" 52 through the exploitation of significant market power (also labeled "power over price"), or the foreclosure of competitors (also labeled "power to exclude").
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Since those provisions share a unity of purpose and, Second, the concept of transversal consistency is also relevant in relation to the tests applicable to assess firms' conduct. The idea here is that strategies which wield similar types of competition concerns should, in principle, be subject to streamlined verification standards.
This particular variant of transversal consistency could have significant consequences on several existing case-law standards. For instance, it is well-known that exchanges of information agreements amongst oligopolists facilitate tacit coordination.
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Like mergers amongst oligopolists, they are a form of "facilitating practice". TFEU, in prohibiting welfare enhancing practices (a so-called "Type I error", or over fixing).
In addition, it may encourage competition authorities, courts, and complainants to circumvent the exoneration of pro-competitive conduct, by promoting innovative, yet untested interpretations of Article 102 TFEU. "
that the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential competition".
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Of course, this paragraph is a far cry from introducing an Article 102(3) TFEU, which would exempt otherwise abusive conduct. The analysis takes place within Article 102 TFEU, and thus bears more resemblance to the "rule of reason" methodology applied in US antitrust law, or with the "efficiency defense" applied under the EUMR.
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This notwithstanding, it renders abuse of dominance law more "transversally consistent" with other domains of competition law, and in turn contributes to legal certainty. In a margin squeeze scenario, a vertically integrated firm excludes downstream rivals by raising the wholesale price of the inputs it sells to them (for instance, access to a telephone network); and/or by decreasing downstream retail prices (for instance, end-users fixed lines' subscriptions).
C. "Internal Consistency", or Consistency within Competition Rules
In this ruling, the Court decided to subject margin squeeze cases to a test distinct, and laxer, from the test applicable in refusal to supply cases, where the vertically integrated firm excludes rivals by withholding supplies of inputs. In refusal to supply cases, three stringent cumulative conditions -notably that the input at hand is "indispensable" to rivals -must indeed be proven to find abuse. 83 To introduce a new, laxer legal standard, the Court rightly sought to distinguish margin squeezes cases from -constructive -refusals to supply cases. At first glance, the reasoning of the Court fulfills the requirement of "internal consistency".
Yet, on close examination, doubts arise as to whether the Court could really distinguish the two types of cases. After all, can a firm charge rivals "unfair" prices within the meaning of Article 102(a) TFEU, if it does not possess something that is "indispensable" to them, within the meaning of the case-law on refusal to supply? Moreover, from an "outcome" perspective, the judgment seems, in and of itself, inconsistent.
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If a firm can lawfully eliminate rivals by withholding supplies, how can it be guilty of abuse when it supplies them at high prices? In the language of driving metaphors, this is akin to prohibiting speeding above 120 km/h, yet tolerating it above 150km/h... And dominant firms should be advised to forego supplies to competitors, rather than to share their inputs with them. All this clearly throws doubts on whether this legal standard is a consistent one.
Finally, the third ramification of the principle of "internal consistency" may also have been occasionally neglected in the competition case-law. Some judgments that introduce novel legal standards indeed cite to inappropriate precedents in support of them. 
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Such pronouncements, which 86 Other forms of "outcome" inconsistencies have appeared in the case-law related to Regulation 1/2003. For instance, the VEBIC and Tele2 Polska judgments, which concern the powers of National Competition Authorities ("NCAs"), are not fully in line with one another. Surely, those cases share the common feature of giving precedence to the principle of effectiveness over procedural autonomy (in this sense, they are also a little incongruent with another ruling, in Pfleiderer, which clearly favours procedural autonomy over effectiveness). However, in VEBIC, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that the effectiveness of EU competition law dictated to entrust NCAs with the ability to appear before the review courts (see CJEU look clearly inconsistent, generate more questions than answers. 90 They would deserve at least a word of explanation.
D. "Scientific Consistency", or Consistency across Competition Law and Economics
As a third best judicial practice, consistency in rule making ought finally to be achieved across the twin disciplines of competition law and economics. In layman's terms, the Court should check that proposed competition law standards "make sense" from an economic standpoint. At the extreme, the Court may even draw inspiration from competition economics to devise legal standards. 
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Of course, there are many economic theories, including conflicting ones. 92 Moreover, the predictions of economic models on the competitive effects of business practices often depend on narrow factual assumptions. 93 Hence, the Court may face an embarrassment of riches, given the luxuriance of alternative economic standards.
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In our opinion, however, those objections are indecisive.
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Contrary to what the vox populi believes, competition economists do not disagree on everything. There are several core, 90 Such as,"is the Court wrong?". In addition, they may lead to the progressive disappearance of solid case-law precedents, through the snow-ball effect linked to the repetition of the new precedent, and the progressive disappearance of older case-law citations. 91 92 Some even say that there are as many economic theories as economists themselves. In the area of predatory pricing, for instance, economists remain divided on whether proof of recoupment is necessary to establish an unlawful abuse. 93 For instance, a 100% market share may well be tantamount to a monopoly in a basic industrial sector, yet confer no market power on its holder in a dynamic industry characterized by network externalities, first mover advantages, and low barriers to entry. 94 And this choice may be tainted by a degree of ideology. 95 Another objection is that if the Court may define and select proposed legal standard on the basis of economic considerations, it should also be able to do so on the basis of other non-economic disciplines, policies, values and goals (e.g., moral, ethics, equity, redistribution, etc.). Needless to recall, however, that in the early 1950s, the adoption of a competition policy was a key component of the achievement of the European Steel and Coal Community, and later of the European Economic Communities, whose primary objectives were, in turn, economic in nature. Consequently, economic considerations have certainly a role to play, possibly in tandem with other considerations, in the design of competition law standards.
general principles of competition economics that seem sufficiently consensual, and that are not contingent on specific assumptions (economists call them "robust" principles). To take only a few examples of them, one would point out to the view that cartels are wholly inefficient, that scale (or size) is not necessarily adverse to welfare, that prices below marginal costs are irrational, that firms respond to incentives, that profits generate entry, etc.
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In concrete terms, "scientific consistency" can help the Court in three aspects of rule-making.
First, given that many competition law concepts are open-textured, the Court is frequently solicited to define the meaning of Treaty provisions (e.g., the notions of "undertaking", "abuse", "concerted practice", etc.) and secondary legislation provisions (e.g., the notion of a "hardcore restriction"). And often, we lawyers, have the reptilian reflex of inventing sui generis concepts, whose primary effect is to create new definitional uncertainties. In such settings, the Court can -and should not hesitate to -craft legal definitions that borrow to the language of competition economics, when legal jargon is all but useful.
Interestingly, the existing case-law of the Court brings telling illustrations of this. For instance, the Court was used to define "collective dominance" with sui generis terms such as "correlative factors", 97 "collective entity" and "connecting factors". 98 As a result, it remained long unclear whether pure oligopolistic tacit collusion was covered under Article 102 TFEU. 99 In the Bertelsmann AG v. Impala ruling, the Court eventually accepted to talk the language of economics, by equating collective dominance with the economic notion of "tacit coordination" in "oligopoly" markets. 100 In so doing, it dispelled all outstanding uncertainties. 101 From a scientific consistency standpoint, this is a welcome judgment.
In contrast, several competition law concepts that have voyaged through the decades could benefit from a definitional "lifting". The antiquated notion of a "dominant position" belongs to the list of priority candidates. 102 The case-law defines it in terms of "independence" from competitors, customers and consumers. 103 But from an economic standpoint, no firm "except maybe a monopolist protected by insurmountable barriers to entry and facing a completely inelastic demand" has such independence. 104 In addition, the requirement of independence is not consistent with the application of Article 102 TFEU to jointly dominant firms in a state of oligopolistic "interdependence". 105 Another client for a definitional revision is the vexing notion of anticompetitive "object" under Article 101 TFEU. In a string of judgments, the Court has moved away from characterizing "object" as "intent", "aim" or "purpose". 106 notion to an indeterminate range of practices whose categorization as a restriction by "object" requires an "individual assessment" of "the content of its provisions, the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part" (e.g., selective distribution, exchange of information agreements, etc.). 107 This case law has disconcerted many lawyers. 108 Here again, however, economics can soothe lawyers' concerns. From an economic standpoint, a restriction by object should be defined as conduct, which in the abstract, can be presumed to trigger anticompetitive effects with a high likelihood (for instance, a cartel). 109 Accumulated enforcement experience and economic theory shall provide guidance on which practices can be presumed to hobble competition. In contrast, all practices whose proclivity to trigger anticompetitive effects is indeterminate should fall out of the "object" box, and be subject to a concrete, full-blown effects-based assessment (for instance, an exclusivity contract). 110 The second level where "scientific consistency" is important concerns the creation of evidentiary standards. Proposed case-law tests for the prohibition or exoneration of business practices under the competition rules should be consistent with -and possibly draw inspiration from -basic competition economics. 111 The Court's case-law offers a wealth of illustrations of this, and it is beyond the ambition of this paper to discuss them all. To talk of prohibition standards first, perhaps one of the best examples of "scientific consistency" belongs to the field of predatory pricing. 112 and later in Tetra Pak II, the Court devised legal standards aligned on the so-called "Areeda-
Turner" price-costs test. 113 It held that prices below average variable costs ("AVC") must always be considered abusive. 114 In more recent times, the Court in Post Danmark substituted the AVC benchmark with the average incremental costs ("AIC"") benchmark, presumably to reflect advances in economic theory. 115 According to economists, AIC is better than AVC, "because it most accurately reflects the cost of making the predatory sales". On the other hand, the Court has revised legal standards that risked exonerating welfarereducing practices. In Magill and IMS Health, for instance, it developed an "exceptional circumstances" doctrine, to force dominant firms to grant licences on their IP rights, if this raised an obstacle to the apparition of a new product. 125 In Compagnie Maritime Belge, the Court also observed that in "specific circumstances" above costs price cuts could be deemed abusive. 126 In Tetra Pak II, the Court noted that price cuts by a non-dominant firm could be tantamount to abuse in "special circumstances". 127 Finally, in TeliaSonera, the Court introduced three exceptions to the "general rule" that low prices are only abusive if they do not cover the dominant firm's own costs.
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IV. Conclusion
In his memoirs, J. MONNET recalled that on the entire territory of the Community, he had never heard anyone criticize a judgment of the Court.
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MONNET, however, had not anticipated that with rising penalties imposed on businesses for competition infringements, the naysayers would become increasingly vocal.
As explained previously, however, many of those who lambast the Court's competition caselaw are biased by self-serving interests. In our opinion, consistency in rule-making provides a better, objective benchmark to assess the Court's competition output.
In the future, if the Court wants to live up to the remarkable quality of its case law in EU competition cases, it should seek, as a best judicial practice, to craft consistent competition law standards. Of course, our three best practices for consistent rule-making may not always be "ergonomic". They will not always point out to a silver-bullet solution, and will rather leave the Court with a variety of options. Moreover, they may even be inconsistent with one another.
But, it is eventually the Court's duty to arbiter such difficult situations. And in this mission, the Court is not alone. After all, the Commission, the parties, the Member States and the national courts all have a voice to express in the rule-making process. 
